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Abstract 
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understanding law through the scope of legitimacy how does the law come to calculate, decide, institute, 
pronounce and effect? By what right? On what foundation, origin, universalising pretext, does it so act? If 
we abandon this line of questioning, the pursuance ofwhich would only lead us through a gyre ofself-
referential dilemmas circumventing the concept of 'origin', it becomes dear that it is precisely the role of 
the origin in its law-configuring mode that problematises what law can and does do, that is to say, what 
law is. But, even having isolated this theoretical agenda, there are no obvious signposts to navigate one's 
journey into this 'law-configuring origin'. 
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Consciousness is a light which illuminates the world from one end to
another; everything which goes offinto the past is recalled or recovered
by history
-Emmanuel Levinas
The history of law is a history of finitude, which would be only
one ofthe many histories offinitude, of the human condition or
ontology. This irreducible point escapes those who invest all their
efforts in understanding law through the scope of legitimacy -
how does the law come to calculate, decide, institute, pronounce
and effect? By what right? On what foundation, origin,
universalising pretext, does it so act? If we abandon this line of
questioning, the pursuance ofwhich would only lead us through
a gyre ofself-referential dilemmas circumventing the concept of
'origin', it becomes dear that it is precisely the role of the origin
in its law-configuring mode that problematises what law can and
does do, that is to sa}', what law is. But, even having isolated this
theoretical agenda, there are no obvious signposts to navigate
one's journey into this 'law-configuring origin'. The origin does
not present itselfas a construct, a system with its own programme,
or a concept with conventional points of access. It is not even
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certain which questions one should be asking. One might
articulate the law ofthe origin as that which makes possible the
iterabiJity of law, and somehow we are back to archaeological
inquiries, as though there is a singular historical logic to law that
writes its way towards a birth.
Instead ofworking on a trace ofa concept that idiomatically
represents itselfexactly through this trace, we should investigate
the embryonic space by which the origin comes to see the light
of day: the space of consciousness-. Such a project would efface
all of the presuppositions inherent in asking original questions
since it would set up the origin as the condition ofthinking rather
than the object of thought; in this vein, its mode of operation
(founding, repeating, conserving) comes to constitute the law of
the origin. The rationalist programme embraced by Descartes in
his Third Meditation to destroy and reconstruct consciousness
from the ground up confronts this very same problem of the
origin; in it we witness the ways in which the origin pervades all
aspects of Descartes' philosophy of apperception, including the
attempt to overcome the law which ensures its existence and.
penetration.
II
The immanence that inheres in consciousness, otherwise referred
to as presence, operates as the originary point ofall signification.
The Cartesian Cogito is the paradigm of this relation. Through
a mechanism ofsceptical inquiry it places into play the a priori
end of certainty as the condition of knowledge proper. This is
the case despite the fact that the sceptical process, the moving
force for the proofofthe Cogito)s existence, is never itselfaccorded
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the philosophical benefits ofdoubt - why should I not also doubt
the scepticism that inculpates me in the doubting ofmy existence?
The third of Descartes' Meditations is situated in a
precarious location as regards the logic ofthe entire epistemology.
It proceeds with, as the necessary starting point, the proofwhich
precedes it, that is, the existence of the Cogito (First and Second
Meditations); at the same time, the proofof the existence ofGod
is implicated as the inoculative condition of the Cogito. There is
a ·confluence of solipsism and metaphysics such that God is
conceived as the principle ofself-certainty pre-empting the self
Let us analyse the rationality overseeing this problematic.
1. What is the relation that inheres in consciousness? It is
the Cogito's encounter with the Infinite, the incommensurable
di God. This is the crux of the First and Second Meditations.
And it is conceived as an encounter that is primordial to thinking:
'1 have long had fixed in mymind the belief that an all-powerful
God existed by whom I have been created such as I am' (First
Meditation); '1 have in me the notion of the infinite earlier than
the finite - to wit, the notion of God before that of myself'
(Third Meditation) (Descartes 1986: 147, 166). The primordial
encounter, ofmyselfwith the Infinite, founds the Cogito's capacity
to prove its existence. Once this proof is executed, proof of the
existence ofGod follows, arid it follows directly from the premise
of the Cogito's verified presence. However, the existence of God
is merely an intellectual necessity, in the sense ofa reassurance of
the Cogito; it has no existential value of itself. Recall that the
decisive moment of the proof of the Cogito as anything that is
not empty, that is, as something rather than nothing, is that the
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all-powerful deceiving genius is not God: implicitly, that God
exists but does not exist ipso facto in the deceiving. l
2. What significance can be attributed to the relationship
between the Cogito and God, where the Cogito encounters God
as the Infinite that must have always existed, at the same time
that God's existence begins its life as an object for the Cogito's
scepticism? Levinas awakens in this relationship - and it is as
much a creative as a salvaging gesture - the 'eminence' that is the
idea of God. The eminent fulfils itself through the elision of
consciousness, the breakup ofpresence to self. What is invoked in
this originary, pre-conscious idea of the Infinite which breaks up
thought in its actuality, is a 'passivity' of consciousness that is
more passive than can be contained in any signification or history
of the present. 'It is then an idea signifying with a signifyingness
prior to presence, to all presence, prior to every origin i6
consciousness and thus an-archical, accessible in its trace' (Levinas
1996a: 137). This is a defensible reading, and it is indeed a deft
move to isolate the discriminate and uncontained nature ofGod
- recalling that for Descartes the notion of the Infinite precedes
that of the I - and import it with the passivity that awakens
consciousness from its assumed bind to being-present-to-self.
However, there is a crucial omission, and it may be one that
Levinas refuses, rather than fails, to recognise: the strategy works
to elide consciousness' grasp on the idea ofinfinity in the Infinite
- even as Levinas acknowledges the synthesising and
'encompassing movement' of the Cogito. Let us examine this
point in some detail.
3. What is at stake in the fact that Levinas overlooks the
reliance of the idea ofinfinity (in the Infinite) to consciousness'
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hold., thus enabling him to read in the Third Meditation the
beyond...presence of Infinity that allows the break up of
consciousness? What is precisely elided is the Cartesian theory
of Idea as the representation or surrogacy of mind's animate and
dynamic property. We might heuristically compare this with
Plato's hierarchical framework binding the concepts oEldeas and
soul. In Plato, Ideas conjure the noetic, purely intelligible, invisible
and absolute reality, the originary knowledge which is always the
'former knowledge' we have of things. Plato's Phaedo is especially
concerned to demonstrate (beyond the proofof the existence of
the soul. after death) the character of the universal realm which
he understands by the word 'Ideas'. The Ideas belong to the
relation of idea and the coming-into-being ofidea, or ousia and
genesis,2 and Plato's dialogue a.ims to ensure that the distinction
maintained in this relation is understood, especially as against
the Pythagorean bias for numerical-existential order. 3 The
comparison ofthe Platonic and Cartesian Ideas may be expressed
through an observation on linguistic usage: Plato designates the
concept of Ideas as the space of absolute reality, never objective
reality. What is termed 'objective' by Plato consists of the
existential things (,unintelligible' and 'dissoluble') to which
absolute knowledge is applied through human senses. By contrast,
the absolute is necessarily ontologically purified of the
phenomenal, the non-theoretical, and resides in the atemporality
preceding hUffi.an birth.4 Socrates argues for the soul's immortality
by placing it in the same realm as absolute reality, or Ideas.5 As
with the absolute qualities/essences/standards by which sensible
objects are comprehended, the soul exists before human life and
reigns over the temporal body. The soul is thus co-existent and
co-equal in all other respects with Ideas. The Platonic Ideas can
never be derived from the soul, or constitute its expression, that
179
Buonamano
is, they cannot constitute the objective reality that sits in a relation
with the subject (soul/mind); for, by definition, an absolute can
have no origin but itself: nor can it he a product or image of
another. The absolute sits at the threshold ofthe circumscription
of consciousness, reflecting it as a limit.
The discussion of,ideas' in the Third Meditation proceeds,
superficiallyat least, to sketch an ontology by which certain ideas,
those pertaining to objects which appear to me to be outside of
me, have their origin from without the mind: 'I experience in
myself that these ideas do not depend on my will nor therefore
on myself - for they often present themselves to my mind in
spite ofmy will' (Descartes 1980: 160). Descartes conceives ofa
hierarchy ofideas, including those ideas which are merely 'modes'
or 'accidents' ofthought and those which represent 'substances~,
the latter participating in a 'higher degree ofbeing or perfection'
than the former. Further, the 'idea again by which 1 understand
a supreme God, eternal, infinite, [immutable], omniscient,
omnIpotent, and Creator of all things which are outside of
Himself, has certainly more objective reality in itself than those
ideas by which finite substances are represented' (Descartes 1980:'
162). What, then, does it mean to possess objective reality? We
know, utilising logic only, that an object can only be the object
of a subject; which is to say, that the existence of an object
necessarily implicates the existence ofa subject circumscribed br
the territoriality of the object. Objective reality, then, refers to
the·orientation an object has towards a (its) subject. In this context,
'orientation'· may be understood as the adoption of a position or
definiteness in a relation; here, the relation ofobject to subject.
The difference that exists as amongst the concepts 'absolute' in
Plato and 'objective' in Descartes points to the relative
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thematizadon ofimmanence and transcendence - this determines
the defined position in orientation. For Plato, the immanence of
the Idea allows for a distinct space (non-destructible through
any conception whatsoever) which is transcendent ofthe human
and all relations set up by the human; the conceptual relation
subject-object has no Iole to play in this ontology of Ideas. For
Descartes, the objective space is not transcendent of the subject;
instead, it is caught up with the subject's transcendentalism, which
is also the immanence of the subject in relation to objectivity:
'Objectivity here will assume a certainty ofknowledge rather than
presuppose a truth recognised as preexisting, or already there'
,Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 27). By virtue of the forces that bind
i9~as to the subject, ideas can never attain a transcendence from
the Cogito, that is, to the limit of thought thinking itself; at
best, they maintain the quality ofeminence, the perpetual ascent
or elevation through which they strive for an absolute in spite of,
and by virtue of, the Cogito's reign.
The relation subject-object which gives rise to ideas
constitutes the ground from which Cartesian epistemology is
made possible; in Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, the
'prephilosophical' or 'plane of immanence' that contains the
intuition that philosophy presupposes. 'In Descartes it is a matter
of a subjective understanding implicitly presupposed by the "1
think" as first concept; in Plato it is the virtual image ofan already-
thought that doubles every actual concept' (Deleuze & Guattari
1994: 40). The question of infinite movement arising from the
Cartesian plane may be legitimated only within the rubric of a
deterritorialisation6 that severs the territorial connections extant
in the concepts or ideas fixing themselves to the intuitiv~ plane.
In the Meditations the question of infinite movement remains
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the experimentalist prerogative of thought, which, by virtue of
the legacy of the concept of ideas, refuses to recognise a right
that it does not grant. Here, movement is halted, restrained under
the immanent-Universal subject reflecting its essence/existence
in every thought: 'Transcendence enters as soon as movement of
the infinite is stopped' (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 47).
The idea of God, the Infinite, is known to the Cogito
through the substantialist notions of immutability, omniscience,
omnipotence, etc. And we know, so the proof runs, that the
Cogito is not the cause ofthese notions insofar as (this is merely
the skeleton of the proof): A. 'there must at least be as much
reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect;' B. the Cogito,
as a finite and imperfect substance, lacking all of the attributes
pertaining to God, cannot have as much reality as God; C. for
the Cogito to continue to exist, ipso facto its cause must be
concerned with the Cogito's conservation, nor can this conserving
power reside in the Cogito which, as a purely thinking substance,
could not fail to be cognisant of the power; D. the conserving
force that exists outside the Cogito must at least have as much
reality as the Cogito, that is, must possess all the ideas inherent
in the Cogito, including, crucially, that ofGod; E. the conserving
cause must be God if it is self-existent - and it must be self~
existent since that which perpetually conserves the Cogito cannot
have an infinitely regressing origin - by virtue that the possession
of self-existence implicates possession of all the perfections of
'\Yhich it has the idea. Remaining at a topographical level 'of
analysis, we observe an overarching presence that moves through
this proof. Where Descartes attempts to sever what initially
appears as the inevitable unity of apperception and Idea in
consciousness, by isolating the 'Infinite-put-in-me~
182
The Law ofthe Origin
'contemporaneous with my creation' (Levinas's phrases), there is
only the subject making its presence felt through this ambitious
rationalisation. Ifthe Infinite is a self-sufficient cause outside the
Cogito, all that pertains to the Infinite and its causative and
conservative properties nonetheless exist in the necessity or
extension of the Cogito's conservation. The Infinite is, by virtue
ofits own declared teleology, tied ad infinitum to the conserving
of thought's being, for absent this being the idea of God is
impossible. It is as much to say that the Infinite is only to the
extent that it belongs to the ontological capacity of the idea of
the infinite, which is the operating principle ofthe object's relation
to the subject: God, in his perfection, is limited to being a
perfection thought by me.
When Levinas speaks ofthe Infinite thinking beyond what
it thinks, beyond the intentionality of the subject, he invokes an
entire discourse (alterity, Other, autruz) of intelligibility with
_respect to the contradiction embodied in the question, how could
the idea of the Infinite be held in a finite thought?7 The
contradiction remains a contradiction, although a sterile one so
far as Descartes' epistemological proofs are concerned, as long as
the Infinite is entirely represented by the idea ofinfinity, and for
that matter, thinking entirely represented by the possessing of
ideas in the Cogito's perpetual reassurance ofits existence. In his
r~ading of the Third Meditation Levinas must resign himself to
the aporia that the awakening of a consciousness 'which is not
awakened enough' merely constitutes the transcendental motions
peculiar to and subsumed within subjectivity - the bursts of
signification prophetically seeking a threshold to the immanent-
subject, or transcendence of the contained Cogito {'thinking
which is no longer aim, vision, will, or intention' (Levinas 199Gb:
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157)), and instead finding the condition of its own embryo -
the permanence ofidea - reifled in each movement as the ultimate
testimony ofpresence.
III
If we return to the hypothesis with which we commenced, that
the Jaw ofthe origin is the singular paradigm that both constructs
and unravels the edifice ofconsciousness, we notice that there is
a missing piece: too little has been said of the finite-infinite
relation in its metaphysical rather than epistemological
functioning. A passage in the Fourth Meditation attempts to
deliver a metaphysical picture, locating the Cogito in a definable
position relative to the ontological poles, Being and non-being.
And again the question of participation is raised: is it possible
that there exists an ontic entity that does not rely on my (the
Cogito's) participation? The question may now also be put in
another way: has consciousness the power to displace the origin
where the origin is instituted by law, thus bound to perennially
repeat itself through the government of consciousness in the
thinking beyond the'!' to the Infinite?
And it is true that when I think only of God [and direct my
mind wholly to Him], I discover [in myself] no cause oferror,
or falsity; yet directly afterwards, when recurring to myself,
experience shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an
infinitude of errors) as to which) when we come to investigate
them more closely, I notice that not only is there a real and
positive idea ofGod or ofa Being ofsupreme perfection present
to my mind, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of
nothing, that is, of that which is infinitely removed from any
kind of perfection; and that I am in a sense something
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intermediate between God and nought, i.e. placed in such a
manner between the supreme Being and non-being, that there
is in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as
sovereign Being has formed me; but that, as I in some degree
participate likewise in nought or in non-being, ie. in so far as I
am not myself the supreme Being, and as I find myself subject
to an infinitude of imperfections, I ought not to be astonished
if I should fall into error (Descartes 1986: 172-173).
Ricoeur warns us not to conclude from this 'intercalation' that
'man' is an object whose ontological site and morphology are
'fixed by [man)s] relation to other realities that are more or less
complex) intelligent, and independent than man. Man is not
intermediate because he is between angel and animal; he is
intermediate within himself, within his selves. He is intermediate
because he is a mixture, and a mixture because he brings about
mediations. His ontological characteristic ofbeing-intermediate
consists precisely in that his act of existing is the very act of
bringing about mediations between all the modalities and all the
levels of reality within him and outside him' (Ricoeur 1986: 2-
3). But we must rescue Descartes from this anthropological vision
and restore him to the role ofsupreme metaphysician. The selves
that Ricoeur refers to are nothing) for Descartes, ifnot aspects of
finitude circumscribed by its relation to the Infinite. The
mediations amongst Being and non-being are themselves the
forces propelling the transcendental movement of the subject,
which always and necessarily functions to restore, conserve and
maintain immanence at its core. It will suffice to interrogate two




Being and non-being. We can assume on the basis of the
care that Descartes takes with respect to terminology and
phrasing, that the designation of the non-God (non-perfection,
non-infinity) ontological pole with the term 'non-being', that is,
lowercase 'b' rather than capitalised 'B', is not arbitrary. The
framework is very deliberate, if somewhat obscured by the need
to emphasise the epistemological argument on human error.
Between Being and non-being is the space ofintermediacy: being}
or finitude. The importance of this space is less where it lies, and
on this issue we concur with Ricoeur's argument that the
'intermediate' classification does not correspond to a geographical
location but to a function, and more with respect to its modus
operandi: that it radicalises, and in so doing} ensures the possibility
of, the other ontological spaces; both Being (God, perfection,
Infinite) and non-being (nothingness) absence} are
hermeneutically grounded in being {the thinking I that is
susceptible to error, hence finite}. This leads directly to the second
observation.
Beingandnon-beingare 'ideas'which are presentto my mind'.
The legacy of the proof In the Third Meditation appears with
increased luminosity in the decisive expressions utilised in this
passage from the Fourth. The 'real and positive idea ofGod' and
the 'certain negative idea of nothing' which are 'present to my
mind' remain ideas predisposed to the law ofthe doubting Co-gito.
There is no distance from the Cngito, or the distance that is
apparent from the conceptualisation of the Infinite is illusory} a
representatio~_ ?f ~he philosop~ical spirit, nothing more. In 'his
discussion ofthe First Meditation and Foucault's critique,Derrida
situates the 'hyperbolical' moment of the Cogito in the return to
an original point no longer belonging to a determined reason or
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a determined unreason: 'Whether I am mad or not, Cogito, sum.'s
This origin, Descartes' 'zero point' in the terminology ofDerrida
or 'immanent plane' in that of Deleuze and Guattari, cannot be
reduced to an instance of revelation, a simple, non-divisible
primordial entity, the mysterious convocation of a conceptual
moment that belongs to itself and no other. What is clearly at
stake in the pre-philosophical stage of consciousness is the
interpenetration ofthe origin in the metaphysical constructs that
follow in the shadows of the transcendental subject, the
immanence invoked by the Cogito's perpetual self-reassuring.
This interpenetration is what at the outset was denoted by the
phrase, the law ofthe origin.
The origin cannot be displaced in Cartesian ontology, at
least not as easily as Levinas would have us believe (thinking
beyond the subject to, and through, the Infinite, where the
Infinite is a concept conceptualised in accordance with the
subject's transcendence ofthe objects it individualises in its wake,
is riddled with spectral images that make thinking beyond thought
an impossibility - Derrida summarises this as thought remaining
'within thought'). The presence ofthe origin- being, the thinking
substance that mediates all others through the having of ideas -
is instituted in the Third Meditation with reprise in each of the
other Meditations. Thinking along with Descartes, which is to
say through Descartes or beyond him, is a project that inevitably









The crucial passage: l\nd certainly:> since I have no reason to
believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not
yet satisfied myself that there is a God at alL the reason for
doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, a"nd
so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to
remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the
occasion presents itself; and ifI find that there is a God, I must
also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a
knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be
certain ofanything' (Descartes 1986: 159).
See the study of Gadamer (1980) titled 'The Proofs of
Immortality in Plato's Phaedo'.
'And precisely herein lies the limitation of the Pythagorean
explanation ofnumberandworld, Pythagoreans take numbers and
numerical relationshipsfor existence itselfand are unable to think
o/the noetic order a/existence by itself (Gadamer 1980: 35).
'Then ifwe obtained it before our birth:> and possessed it when
, we were born, we had knowledge, bom before and at the moment
ofbirth, not only ofequality and relative magnitudes, but ofall
absolute standards. Our present argument applies no more to
equality than it does to absolute beauty:> goodness:> uprightness,
holiness, and, as I maintain, all those characteristics which we
designate in our discussion by the term "absolute'" (Plato 1996:
75c~75d).
'The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligible,
uniform, indissoluble, and ever self~consistent and invariable
... if this is its condition, then it departs to that place which is,
like itself,-invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, where, on its
arrival, happiness awaits it, and release from uncertainty and
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evils, and where, as they say of the initiates in the Mysteries, it
really spends the rest of time with God' (Plato 1996: 80b, 81 a).
For De1euze and Guattari the possibility of a deterritorialised
plane ofimmanence resorts to an imanence that is not orientated
to the subject, that is not immanent to something other than
itself: (Such a plane is, perhaps, a radical empiricism: it does not
present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and
individualized in that which belongs to a self It presents only
events, that is~ possible worlds as concepts, and otherpeople as
expressions of possible worlds or conceptual personae' (1994:
47-8).
See Levinas' (l996b) essay, 'Transcendence and Intelligibility',
especially the section sub-titled, 'The Idea ofthe Infinite in Us'.
The complete paragraph reads: 'The hyperbolical audacity of
the Cartesian Cogito, its mad audacity, which we perhaps no
longer perceive as such because, unlike Descartes's contemporar}',
we are too well assured ofourselves and too well accustomed to
the framework of the Cogito, rather than to the critical
experience of it - its mad audacity would consist in the return
to an original point which no longer belongs to either a
determined reason or a determined unreason, no longer belongs
to them as opposition or alternative. Whether I am mad or not,
Cogito, sum. Madness· is therefore, in every sense of the word,
only one case of thought (within thought). It is therefore a
question ofdrawing back toward a point at which all determined
contradictions, in the form ofgiven, factual hisrorical structures,
can appear, and appear as relative to this zero point at which
determined meaning and non-meaning come together in their
common origin. From this point of view which here is ours,
one could perhaps say the following about this zero point,
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